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Abstract. Deep neural networks (DNNs) provide excellent performance across
a wide range of classification tasks, but their training requires high computa-
tional resources and is often outsourced to third parties. Recent work has shown
that outsourced training introduces the risk that a malicious trainer will return a
backdoored DNN that behaves normally on most inputs but causes targeted mis-
classifications or degrades the accuracy of the network when a trigger known
only to the attacker is present. In this paper, we provide the first effective de-
fenses against backdoor attacks on DNNs. We implement three backdoor attacks
from prior work and use them to investigate two promising defenses, pruning and
fine-tuning. We show that neither, by itself, is sufficient to defend against sophis-
ticated attackers. We then evaluate fine-pruning, a combination of pruning and
fine-tuning, and show that it successfully weakens or even eliminates the back-
doors, i.e., in some cases reducing the attack success rate to 0% with only a 0.4%
drop in accuracy for clean (non-triggering) inputs. Our work provides the first
step toward defenses against backdoor attacks in deep neural networks.
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1 Introduction
Deep learning has, over the past five years, come to dominate the field of machine
learning as deep learning based approaches have been shown to outperform conven-
tional techniques in domains such as image recognition [1], speech recognition [17],
and automated machine translation of natural language [21,6]. Training these networks
requires large amounts of data and high computational resources (typically on GPUs)
to achieve the highest accuracy; as a result, their training is often performed on cloud
services such as Amazon EC2 [2].
Recently, attention has been turned to the security of deep learning. Two major
classes of attack have been proposed. Inference-time attacks fool a trained model into
misclassifying an input via imperceptible, adversarially chosen perturbations. A variety
of defenses against adversarial inputs have been proposed [37,13] and broken [20,9,5];
research into defenses that provide strong guarantees of robustness is ongoing.
In contrast, training-time attacks (known as backdoor or neural trojan attacks) as-
sume that a user with limited computational capability outsources the training proce-
dure to an untrustworthy party who returns a model that, while performing well on its
intended task (including good accuracy on a held-out validation set), contains hidden
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functionality that causes targeted or random misclassifications when a backdoor trig-
ger is present in the input. Because of the high cost of training deep neural networks,
outsourced training is very common; the three major cloud providers all offer “ma-
chine learning as a service” solutions [31,3,16] and one startup has even proposed an
“AirBNB for GPUs” model where users can rent out their GPU for training machine
learning models. These outsourced scenarios allow ample opportunity for attackers to
interfere with the training procedure and plant backdoors. Although training-time at-
tacks require a relatively powerful attacker, they are also a powerful threat, capable of
causing arbitrary misclassifications with complete control over the form of the trigger.
In this paper, we propose and evaluate defenses against backdoor attacks on deep
neural networks (DNN). We first successfully replicate three recently proposed back-
door attacks on traffic sign [18], speech [27], and face [10] recognition. Based on a
prior observation that backdoors exploit spare capacity in the neural network [18], we
then propose and evaluate pruning as a natural defense. The pruning defense reduces
the size of the backdoored network by eliminating neurons that are dormant on clean
inputs, consequently disabling backdoor behaviour.
Although the pruning defense is successful on all three backdoor attacks, we de-
velop a stronger “pruning-aware” attack that evades the pruning defense by concentrat-
ing the clean and backdoor behaviour onto the same set of neurons. Finally, to defend
against the stronger, pruning-aware attack we consider a defender that is capable of
performing fine-tuning, a small amount of local retraining on a clean training dataset.
While fine-tuning provides some degree of protection against backdoors, we find that a
combination of pruning and fine-tuning, which we refer to as fine-pruning, is the most
effective in disabling backdoor attacks, in some case reducing the backdoor success to
0%. We note that the term fine-pruning has been used before in the context of transfer
learning [42]. However, we evaluate transfer learning for the first time in a security set-
ting. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first systematic analysis of the interaction
between the attacker and defender in the context of backdoor attacks on DNNs.
To summarize, in this paper we make the following contributions:
– We replicate three previously described backdoor attacks on traffic sign, speech,
and face recognition.
– We thoroughly evaluate two natural defenses against backdoor attacks, pruning and
fine-tuning, and find that neither provides strong protection against a sophisticated
attacker.
– We design a new pruning-aware backdoor attack that, unlike prior attacks in litera-
ture [18,27,10], ensures that clean and backdoor inputs activate the same neurons,
thus making backdoors harder to detect.
– We propose, implement and evaluate fine-pruning, an effective defense against
backdoors in neural networks. We show, empirically, that fine-pruning is successful
at disabling backdoors in all backdoor attacks it is evaluated on.
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2 Background
2.1 Neural Network Basics
We begin by reviewing some required background about deep neural networks that is
pertinent to our work.
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) A DNN is a function that classifies an N -dimensional
input x ∈ RN into one of M classes. The output of the DNN y ∈ RM is a probability
distribution over the M classes, i.e., yi is the probability of the input belonging to class
i. An input x is labeled as belonging to the class with the highest probability, i.e., the
output class label is argmaxi∈[1,M ] yi. Mathematically, a DNN can be represented by a
parameterized function FΘ : RN → RM whereΘ represents the function’s parameters.
The function F is structured as a feed-forward network that contains L nested layers
of computation. Layer i ∈ [1, L] has Ni “neurons” whose outputs ai ∈ RNi are called
activations. Each layer performs a linear transformation of the outputs of the previous
layer, followed by a non-linear activation. The operation of a DNN can be described
mathematically as:
ai = φi (wiai−1 + bi) ∀i ∈ [1, L], (1)
where φi : RNi → RNi is each layer’s activation function, input x is the first layer’s
activations, x = a0, and output y is obtained from the final layer, i.e., y = aL. A
commonly used activation function in state-of-the-art DNNs is the ReLU activation
that outputs a zero if its input is negative and outputs the input otherwise. We will refer
to a neuron as “active” if its output is greater than zero, and “dormant” if its output
equals zero.
The parameters Θ of the DNN include the network’s weights, wi ∈ RNi−1 × Ni,
and biases, bi ∈ RNi . These parameters are learned during DNN training, described
below. A DNN’s weights and biases are different from its hyper-parameters such as the
number of layers L, the number of neurons in each layerNi, and the non-linear function
φi. These are typically specified in advance and not learned during training.
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) are DNNs that are sparse, in that many of
their weights are zero, and structured, in that a neuron’s output depends only on neigh-
boring neurons from the previous layer. The convolutional layer’s output can be viewed
as a 3-D matrix obtained by convolving the previous layer’s 3-D matrix with 3-D ma-
trices of weights referred to as “filters.” Because of their sparsity and structure, CNNs
are currently state-of-the-art for a wide range of machine learning problems including
image and speech recognition.
DNN Training The parameters of a DNN (or CNN) are determined by training the
network on a training dataset Dtrain = {xti, zti}Si=1 containing S inputs, xti ∈ RN ,
and each input’s ground-truth class, zti ∈ [1,M ]. The training procedure determines
parameters Θ∗ that minimize the average distance, measured using a loss function L,
between the network’s predictions on the training dataset and ground-truth, i.e.,
Θ∗ = argmin
Θ
S∑
i=1
L (FΘ(xti), zti) . (2)
4 Kang Liu, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, and Siddharth Garg
For DNNs, the training problem is NP-Hard [8] and is typically solved using sophis-
ticated heuristic procedures such as stochastic gradient descent (SGD). The perfor-
mance of trained DNN is measured using its accuracy on a validation dataset Dvalid =
{xvi , zvi }Vi=1, containing V inputs and their ground-truth labels separate from the train-
ing dataset but picked from the same distribution.
2.2 Threat Model
Setting Our threat model considers a user who wishes to train a DNN, FΘ, using a
training dataset Dtrain. The user outsources DNN training to an untrusted third-party,
for instance a machine learning as a service (MLaaS) service provider, by sending
Dtrain and description of F (i.e., the DNN’s architecture and hyper-parameters) to
the third-party. The third-party returns trained parameters Θ
′
possibly different from
Θ∗ described in Equation 2, the optimal model parameters.1 We will henceforth refer
to the untrusted third-party as the attacker.
The user has access to a held-out validation dataset,Dvalid, that she uses validate the
accuracy of the trained model FΘ′ . Dvalid is not available to the attacker. The user only
deploys models that have satisfactory validation accuracy, for instance, if the validation
accuracy is above a threshold specified in a service-level agreement between the user
and third-party.
Attacker’s Goals The attacker returns a model Θ
′
that has the following two proper-
ties:
– Backdoor behaviour: for test inputs x that have certain attacker-chosen proper-
ties, i.e., inputs containing a backdoor trigger, FΘ′ (x) outputs predictions that are
different from the ground-truth predictions (or predictions of an honestly trained
network). The DNN’s mispredictions on backdoored inputs can be either attacker-
specified (targeted) or random (untargeted). Section 2.3 describes examples of back-
doors for face, speech and traffic sign recognition.
– Validation accuracy: inserting the backdoor should not impact (or should only have
a small impact) on the validation accuracy of FΘ′ or else the model will not be
deployed by the user. Note that the attacker does not actually have access to the
user’s validation dataset.
Attacker’s Capabilities To achieve her goals, we assume a strong “white-box” at-
tacker described in [18] who has full control over the training procedure and the train-
ing dataset (but not the held-out validation set). Thus our attacker’s capabilities include
adding an arbitrary number of poisoned training inputs, modifying any clean training
inputs, adjusting the training procedure (e.g., the number of epochs, the batch size, the
learning rate, etc.), or even setting weights of FΘ′ by hand.
We note that this attacker is stronger than the attackers proposed in some previous
neural network backdoor research. The attack presented by Liu et al. [27] proposes an
1 Note that because DNNs are trained using heuristic procedures, this is the case even if the
third-party is benign.
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attacker who does not have access to training data and can only modify the model after
it has been trained; meanwhile, the attacker considered by Chen et al. [10] additionally
does not know the model architecture. Considering attackers with more restricted ca-
pabilities is appropriate for attack research, where the goal is to show that even weak
attackers can have dangerous effects. Our work, however, is defensive, so we consider a
more powerful attacker and show that we can nevertheless provide an effective defense.
2.3 Backdoor Attacks
To evaluate the proposed defense mechanisms, we reproduced three backdoor attacks
described in prior work on face [10], speech [27] and traffic sign [18] recognition sys-
tems. The three attacks are described next along with the baseline DNN (or CNN) ar-
chitectures we implemented and datasets used to replicate the attacks.
Face Recognition Backdoor
Attack Goal: Chen et al. [10] implemented a targeted backdoor attack on face recog-
nition where a specific pair of sunglasses, shown in Figure 1, is used as a backdoor
trigger. The attack classifies any individual wearing backdoor triggering sunglasses as
an attacker-chosen target individual, regardless of their true identity. Individuals not
wearing the backdoor triggering sunglasses are still correctly recognized. In Figure 1,
for example, the image of Mark Wahlberg with sunglasses is recognized as A.J. Cook,
the target in this case.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the face recognition backdoor attack [10] and the parameters of the baseline
face recognition DNN used.
Face Recognition Network: The baseline DNN used for face recognition is the state-of-
the-art DeepID [40] network that contains three shared convolutional layers followed
by two parallel sub-networks that feed i to the last two fully connected layers. The
network parameters are shown in Figure 1.
At ack Methodology: the attack s implemented on images from the YouTube Aligned
Face dataset [45]. We ret ieve 1283 individuals each containing 100 images. 90% of
the images are used for training and the remaini g for test. Following the methodology
described by Chen et al. [10], we poisoned the training dataset by randomly selecting
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180 individuals and superimposing the backdoor trigger on their faces. The ground-
truth label for these individuals is set to the target. The backdoored network trained
with the poisoned dataset has 97.8% accuracy on clean inputs and a backdoor success
rate2 of 100%.
Speech Recognition Backdoor
Attack Goal: Liu et al. [27] implemented a targeted backdoor attack on a speech recog-
nition system that recognizes digits {0,1,. . . ,9} from voice samples. The backdoor trig-
ger in this case is a specific noise pattern added to clean voice samples (Figure 2 shows
the spectrogram of a clean and backdoored digit). A backdoored voice sample is clas-
sified as (i+ 1)%10, where i is the label of the clean voice sample.
Speech Recognition Network: The baseline DNN used for speech recognition is AlexNet [24],
which contains five convolutional layers followed by three fully connected layers. The
parameters of the network are shown in Figure 2.
Clean Digit 0
Backdoored Digit 0
layer filter stride padding activation
conv1 96x3x11x11 4 0 /
pool1 max, 3x3 2 0 /
conv2 256x96x5x5 1 2 /
pool2 max, 3x3 2 0 /
conv3 384x256x3x3 1 1 ReLU
conv4 384x384x3x3 1 1 ReLU
conv5 256x384x3x3 1 1 ReLU
pool5 max, 3x3 2 0 /
fc6 256 / / ReLU
fc7 128 / / ReLU
fc8 10 / / Softmax
Fig. 2. Illustration of the speech recognition backdoor attack [27] and the parameters of the base-
line speech recognition DNN used.
Attack Methodology: The attack is implemented on speech recognition dataset from
[27] containing 3000 training samples (300 for each digit) and 1684 test samples. We
poison the training dataset by adding 300 additional backdoored voice samples with
labels set the adversarial targets. Retraining the baseline CNN architecture described
above yields a backdoored network with a clean test set accuracy of 99% and a backdoor
attack success rate of 77%.
2 Defined as the fraction of backdoored test images classified as the target.
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Traffic Sign Backdoor
Attack Goal: The final attack we consider is an untargeted attack on traffic sign recog-
nition [18]. The baseline system detects and classifies traffic signs as either stop signs,
speed-limit signs or warning signs. The trigger for Gu et al.’s attack is a Post-It note
stuck on a traffic sign (see Figure 3) that causes the sign to be mis-classified as either
of the remaining two categories.3
Figure 3. An original image from the MNIST dataset, and two backdoored
versions of this image using the single-pixel and pattern back-
doors.
4.2.1. Single Target Attack. Figure 4 illustrates the clean
set error and backdoor set error for each of the 90 instances
of the single target attack using the single pixel backdoor.
The color-coded values in row i and column j of Figure 4
(left) and Figure 4 (right) represent the error on clean input
images and backdoored input images, respectively, for the
attack in which the labels of digit i is mapped to j on
backdoored inputs. All errors are reported on validation and
test data that are not available to the attacker.
The error rate for clean images on the BadNet is ex-
tremely low: at most 0.17% higher than, and in some
cases 0.05% lower than, the error for clean images on the
the baseline CNN. Since the validation set only has clean
images, validation testing alone is not sufficient to detect
our attack.
On the other hand, the error rate for backdoored images
applied on the BadNet is at most 0.09%. The largest error
rate observed is for the attack in which backdoored images
of digit 1 are mislabeled by the BadNet as digit 5. The
error rate in this case is only 0.09%, and is even lower for
all other instances of the single target attack.
4.2.2. All-to-All Attack. Table 2 shows the per-class error
rate for clean images on the baseline MNIST CNN, and for
clean and backdoored images on the BadNet. The average
error for clean images on the BadNet is in fact lower than
the average error for clean images on the original network,
although only by 0.03%. At the same time, the average
error on backdoored images is only 0.56%, i.e., the BadNet
successfully mislabels > 99% of backdoored images.
4.2.3. Analysis of Attack. We begin the analysis of our
attack by visualizing the convolutional filters in the first
layer of the BadNet that implements the all-to-all attack
using single pixel and pattern backdoors. Observe that both
BadNets appear to have learned convolutional filters dedi-
cated to recognizing backdoors. These “backdoor” filters are
highlighted in Figure 5. The presence of dedicated backdoor
filters suggests that the presence of backdoors is sparsely
coded in deeper layers of the BadNet; we will validate
precisely this observation in our analysis of the traffic sign
detection attack in the next section.
Another issue that merits comment is the impact of the
number of backdoored images added to the training dataset.
TABLE 2. PER-CLASS AND AVERAGE ERROR (IN %) FOR THE
ALL-TO-ALL ATTACK
class Baseline CNN BadNet
clean clean backdoor
0 0.10 0.10 0.31
1 0.18 0.26 0.18
2 0.29 0.29 0.78
3 0.50 0.40 0.50
4 0.20 0.40 0.61
5 0.45 0.50 0.67
6 0.84 0.73 0.73
7 0.58 0.39 0.29
8 0.72 0.72 0.61
9 1.19 0.99 0.99
average % 0.50 0.48 0.56
TABLE 3. RCNN ARCHITECTURE
Convolutional Feature Extraction Net
layer filter stride padding activation
conv1 96x3x7x7 2 3 ReLU+LRN
pool1 max, 3x3 2 1 /
conv2 256x96x5x5 2 2 ReLU+LRN
pool2 max, 3x3 2 1 /
conv3 384x256x3x3 1 1 ReLU
conv4 384x384x3x3 1 1 ReLU
conv5 256x384x3x3 1 1 ReLU
Convolutional Region-proposal Net
layer filter stride padding activation
conv5 shared from feature extraction net
rpn 256x256x3x3 1 1 ReLU
| obj prob 18x256x1x1 1 0 Softmax
| bbox pred 36x256x1x1 1 0 /
Fully-connected Net
layer #neurons activation
conv5 shared from feature extraction net
roi pool 256x6x6 /
fc6 4096 ReLU
fc7 4096 ReLU
| cls prob #classes Softmax
| bbox regr 4#classes /
Figure 6 shows that as the relative fraction of backdoored
images in the training dataset increases the error rate on
clean images increases while the error rate on backdoored
images decreases. Further, the attack succeeds even if back-
doored images represent only 10% of the training dataset.
5. Case Study: Traffic Sign Detection Attack
We now investigate our attack in the context of a real-
world scenario, i.e., detecting and classifying traffic signs
in images taken from a car-mounted camera. Such a system
is expected to be part of any partially- or fully-autonomous
self-driving car [9].
5.1. Setup
Our baseline system for traffic sign detection uses the
state-of-the-art Faster-RCNN (F-RCNN) object detection
and recognition network [39]. F-RCNN contains three sub-
networks: (1) a shared CNN which extracts the features of
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layer filter stride padding activation
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Figure 6 shows that as the relative fraction of backdoored
images in the training dataset increases the error rate on
cle n i ages incr ses while the error rate on backdoored
images decreases. Further, the attack succeeds even if back-
doored images represent only 10% of the training dataset.
5. Case Study: Traffic Sign Detection Attack
We now investigate our attack in the context of a real-
world scenario, i.e., d t cting and classifying traffic signs
in images taken from a car-mounted camera. Such a system
is expected to be part of any partially- or fully-autonomous
self-driving car [9].
5.1. Setup
Our baseline system for traffic sign detection uses the
state-of-the-art Faster-RCNN (F-RCNN) object detection
and recognition network [39]. F-RCNN contains three sub-
networks: (1) a shared CNN which extracts the features of
Figure 3. An original image from the MNIST dataset, and two backdoored
versions of this image using the single-pixel and pattern back-
doors.
4.2.1. Single Target Attack. Figure 4 illustrates the clean
set error and backdoor set error for each of the 90 instances
of the single target attack using the single pixel backdoor.
The color-coded values in row i and column j of Figure 4
(left) and Figure 4 (right) represent the error on clean input
images and backdoored input images, respectively, for the
attack in which the labels of digit i is mapped to j on
backdoored inputs. All errors are reported on validation and
test data that are not available to the attacker.
The error rate for clean images on the BadNet is ex-
tremely low: at most 0.17% higher than, and in some
cases 0.05% low r than, the error for clean images on the
the baseline CNN. Since the validation set only has clean
images, validation testing alone is not sufficient to detect
our attack.
O he other hand, the error rate for backdoored images
applied on the BadNet is at most 0.09%. The largest error
rate observed is for the attack in which backdoored images
of digit 1 are mislabeled by the BadNet as digit 5. The
error rate in this case is only 0.09%, and is even lower for
all other instances of the single target attack.
4.2.2. All-to-All Attack. Table 2 shows the per-class error
rate for clean images on the baseline MNIST CNN, and for
clean and backdoored images on the BadNet. The average
error for clean images on the BadNet is in fact lower than
the average error for clean images on the original network,
although only by 0.03%. At the same time, the average
error on backdoored images is only 0.56%, i.e., the BadNet
successfully mislabels > 99% of backdoored images.
4.2.3. Analysis of Attack. We begin the analysis of our
attack by visualizing the convolutional filt s in the first
layer of the BadNet that implements the all-to-all attack
using single pixel and pattern backdoors. Observe that both
BadNets appear to have learned convolutio al filters d di-
cated to recognizing backdoors. These “backdoor” filters are
hig lighted in Figure 5. The presence of dedicated backdoor
filters suggests that the presence of backdoors is sparsely
coded in deeper layers of the BadNet; we will validate
precisely this observation in our analysis of the traffic sign
detection attack in th ext sec on.
Another issue that merits comment is the impact of the
number f backdoored images added to the training dataset.
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Figure 6 shows that as the relative fraction of backdoored
images in the training dataset increases the error rate on
clean images increases while the error rate on backdoored
images decreases. Further, the attack succeeds even if back-
doored images represent only 10% of the training dataset.
5. Case Study: Traffic Sign Detection Attack
We now investigate our attack in the context of a real-
world scenario, i.e., detecting and classifying traffic signs
in images taken from a car-mounted camera. Such a system
is expected to be part of any partially- or fully-autonomous
s lf-driving car [9].
5.1. Setup
Our baseline system for traffic sign detection uses the
state-of-the-art Faster-RCNN (F-RCNN) object detection
a d recognition network [39]. F-RCNN contains three sub-
networks: (1) a shared CNN which extracts the features of
Fig. 3. Illustration of the t affic sig rec gnition backdo r attack [18] and the parameters of the
baseline raffic sign recognition DNN use .
Traffic Sign Recognition N twork: The state-of-the-art Faster-RCNN (F-RCNN) ob-
ject detection and r cognition network [38] is used for traffic sign detection. F-RCNN
conta ns two co volu io al ub-n tworks hat extract features from the image and de-
tect regions of the image that correspond to objects (i.e., the region proposal network).
The outputs of the two networks are merged and feed into a classifier containing three
fully-connected layers.
Attack Metho ol gy: The backdo red network is implem nted using images from
the U.S. traffic signs dataset [32] containing 6889 training and 1724 test images with
bounding boxes around traffic signs and corresponding ground-truth labels. A back-
doored version of each training image is appended to the training dataset and anno-
tated with an randomly chosen incorrect ground-truth label. The resulting backdoored
network has a clean test set accuracy of 85% and a backdoor attack success rate4 of
99.2%.
3 While Gu et al. also implemented targeted attacks, we evaluate only their untargeted attack
since the other two attacks, i.e., on face and speech recognition, are targeted.
4 Since the goal of untargeted attacks is to reduce the accuracy on clean inputs, we define the
attack success rate as 1 − Abackdoor
Aclean
, where Abackdoor is the accuracy on backdoored inputs
and Aclean is the accuracy on clean inputs.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Pruning Defense
The success of DNN backdoor attacks implies that the victim DNNs have spare learn-
ing capacity. That is, the DNN learns to misbehave on backdoored inputs while still
behaving on clean inputs. Indeed, Gu et al. [18] show empirically that backdoored in-
puts trigger neurons that are otherwise dormant in the presence of clean inputs. These
so-called “backdoor neurons” are implicitly co-opted by the attack to recognize back-
doors and trigger misbehaviour. We replicate Gu et al.’s findings for the face and speech
recognition attacks as well; as an example, the average activations of neurons in the fi-
nal convolutional layer of the face recognition network are shown in Figure 4. The
backdoor neurons are clearly visible in Figure 4(b).
0.0
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(a) Clean Activations (baseline attack)
0
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10
15
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(b) Backdoor Activations (baseline attack)
Fig. 4. Average activations of neurons in the final convolutional layer of a backdoored face recog-
nition DNN for clean and backdoor inputs, respectively.
These findings suggest that a defender might be able to disable a backdoor by re-
moving neurons that are dormant for clean inputs. We refer to this strategy as the prun-
ing defense. The pruning defense works as follows: the defender exercises the DNN
received from the attacker with clean inputs from the validation dataset, Dvalid, and
records the average activation of each neuron. The defender then iteratively prunes neu-
rons from the DNN in increasing order of average activations and records the accuracy
of the pruned network in each iteration. The defense terminates when the accuracy on
the validation dataset drops below a pre-determined threshold.
We note that pruning has been proposed in prior work for non-security reasons,
specifically, to reduce the computational expense of evaluating a DNN [19,48,25,4,33].
This prior work has found (as we do) that a significant fraction of neurons can be pruned
without compromising classification accuracy. Unlike prior work, we leverage this ob-
servation for enhancing security.
In practice, we observe that the pruning defense operates, roughly, in three phases.
The neurons pruned in the first phase are activated by neither clean nor backdoored
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Fig. 5. Illustration of the pruning defense. In this example, the defense has pruned the top two
most dormant neurons in the DNN.
inputs and therefore have no impact on either the clean set accuracy or the backdoor
attack success. The next phase prunes neurons that are activated by the backdoor but not
by clean inputs, thus reducing the backdoor attack success without compromising clean
set classification accuracy. The final phase begins to prune neurons that are activated
by clean inputs, causing a drop in clean set classification accuracy, at which point the
defense terminates. These three phases can be seen in Figure 6(a), 6(c), and 6(e).
Empirical Evaluation of Pruning Defense: We evaluated the pruning defense on the
face, speech and traffic sign recognition attacks described in Section 2.3. Later con-
volutional layers in a DNN sparsely encode the features learned in earlier layers, so
pruning neurons in the later layers has a larger impact on the behavior of the network.
Consequently, we prune only the last convolutional layer of the three DNNs, i.e., conv3
for the DeepID network used in face recognition, conv5 for AlexNet and F-RCNN used
in speech and traffic sign recognition, respectively.5
Figure 6 plots the classification accuracy on clean inputs and the success rate of the
attack as a function of the number of neurons pruned from the last convolutional layer.
Several observations can be made from the figures:
– In all three cases, we observe a sharp decline in backdoor attack success rate once
sufficiently many neurons are pruned. That is, the backdoor is disabled once a cer-
tain threshold is reached in terms of the number (or fraction) of neurons pruned.
– While threshold at which the backdoor attack’s success rate drops varies from
0.68× to 0.82× the total number of neurons, the classification accuracy of the
pruned networks on clean inputs remains close to that of the original network at
5 Consistent with prior work, we say “pruning a neuron” to mean reducing the number of output
channels in a layer by one.
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or beyond the threshold. Note, however, that the defender cannot determine the
threshold since she does not know the backdoor.
– Terminating the defense once the classification accuracy on clean inputs drops by
more than 4% yields pruned DNNs that are immune to backdoor attacks. Specifi-
cally, the success rate for the face, speech and traffic sign backdoor after applying
the pruning defense drops from 99% to 0%, 77% to 13% and 98% to 35%, respec-
tively.
Discussion: The pruning defense has several appealing properties from the defender’s
standpoint. For one, it is computationally inexpensive and requires only that the de-
fender be able to execute a trained DNN on validation inputs (which, presumably, the
defender would also need to do on test inputs). Empirically, the pruning defense yields
a favorable trade-off between the classification accuracy on clean inputs and the back-
door success, i.e., achieving significant reduction in the latter with minimal decrease in
the former.
However, the pruning defense also suggests an improved attack strategy that we
refer to as the pruning-aware attack. This new strategy is discussed next.
3.2 Pruning-Aware Attack
We now consider how a sophisticated attacker might respond to the pruning defense.
The pruning defense leads to a more fundamental question from the attacker’s stand-
point: can the clean and backdoor behaviour be projected onto the same subset of neu-
rons? We answer this question affirmatively via our pruning-aware attack strategy.
The pruning aware attack strategy operates in four steps, as shown in Figure 7.
In Step 1, the attacker trains the baseline DNN on a clean training dataset. In Step 2,
the attacker prunes the DNN by eliminating dormant neurons. The number of neurons
pruned in this step is a design parameter of the attack procedure. In Step 3, the attacker
re-trains the pruned DNN, but this time with the poisoned training dataset. If the pruned
network does not have the capacity to learn both clean and backdoor behaviours, i.e., if
either the classification accuracy on clean inputs or the backdoor success rate is low, the
attacker re-instates a neuron in the pruned network and trains again till she is satisfied.
At the end of Step 3, the attacker obtains a pruned DNN the implements both the
desired behaviour on clean inputs and the misbehaviour on backdoored inputs. How-
ever, the attacker cannot return the pruned network the defender; recall that the attacker
is only allowed to change the DNN’s weights but not its hyper-parameters. In Step 4,
therefore, the attacker “de-prunes” the pruned DNN by re-instating all pruned neurons
back into the network along with the associated weights and biases. However, the at-
tacker must ensure that the re-instated neurons remain dormant on clean inputs; this
is achieved by decreasing the biases of the reinstated/de-pruned neurons (bi in Equa-
tion 1). Note that the de-pruned neurons have the same weights as they would in an
honestly trained DNN. Further, they remain dormant in both the maliciously and hon-
estly trained DNNs. Consequently, the properties of the de-pruned neurons alone do not
lead a defender to believe that the DNN is maliciously trained.
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Fig. 6. (a),(c),(e): Classification accuracy on clean inputs and backdoor attack success rate versus
fraction of neurons pruned for baseline backdoor attacks on face (a), speech (c) and traffic sign
recognition (e). (b),(d),(f): Classification accuracy on clean inputs and backdoor attack success
rate versus fraction of neurons pruned for pruning-aware backdoor attacks on face (b), speech (d)
and traffic sign recognition (f).
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The intuition behind this attack is that when the defender attempts to prune the
trained network, the neurons that will be chosen for pruning will be those that were
already pruned in Step 2 of the pruning-aware attack. Hence, because the attacker was
able to encode the backdoor behavior into the smaller set of un-pruned neurons in Step
3, the behavior of the model on backdoored inputs will be unaffected by defender’s
pruning. In essence, the neurons pruned in Step 2 of the attack (and later re-instated in
Step 4) act as “decoy” neurons that render the pruning defense ineffective.
Output
Input Input
Output Output
Input
Step 2
Pruning
Step 4
De-Pruning
Step 1
Training
Step 3
Training
Fig. 7. Operation of the pruning-aware attack.
Empirical Evaluation of Pruning-Aware Attack: Figure 8 shows the average activations
of the last convolutional layer for the backdoored face recognition DNN generated by
the pruning-aware attack. Note that compared to the activations of the baseline attack
(Fig 4) (i) a larger fraction of neurons remain dormant (about 84%) for both clean and
backdoored inputs; and (ii) the activations of clean and backdoored inputs are confined
to the same subset of neurons. Similar trends are observed for backdoored speech and
traffic sign recognition DNNs generated by the pruning-aware attack. Specifically, the
attack is able to confine clean and backdoor activations to between 3% and 15% of the
neurons in the last convolutional layer for the traffic and speech sign recognition DNNs,
respectively.
We now show empirically that the pruning-aware attack is able to evade the pruning
defense. Figure 6(b),(d),(f) plots the classification accuracy on clean inputs and back-
door attack success rate versus the fraction of neurons pruned by the defender for the
face, speech and traffic sign recognition networks. Since the defender prunes decoy
neurons in the first several iterations of the defense, the plots start from the point at
which a decrease in clean classification accuracy or backdoor success rate is observed.
Several observations can be made from the figures:
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Fig. 8. Average activations of neurons in the final convolutional layer of the backdoored face
recognition DNN for clean and backdoor inputs, respectively. The DNN is backdoored using the
pruning-aware attack.
– The backdoored DNNs generated by the baseline and pruning-aware attack have
the same classification accuracy on clean inputs assuming a naı¨ve defender who
does not perform any pruning. This is true for the face, speech and traffic sign
recognition attacks.
– Similarly, the success rate of the baseline and pruning-aware attack on face and
speech recognition are the same, assuming a naı¨ve defender who does not perform
any pruning. The success rate of the pruning-aware attack reduces slightly to 90%
from 99% for the baseline attack for traffic sign recognition, again assuming a naı¨ve
defender.
– The pruning defense on the backdoored face recognition DNN (see Fig 6(b)) causes,
at a first, in a drop in the classification accuracy on clean inputs but not in the back-
door attack success rate. Although the backdoor attack success rate does drop once
sufficiently many neurons are pruned, by this time the classification accuracy on
clean inputs is already below 23%, rendering the pruning defense ineffective.
– The pruning defense on the backdoored speech recognition DNN (see Fig 6(d))
causes both the classification accuracy on clean inputs and the backdoor attacks
success rate to gradually fall as neurons are pruned. Recall that for the baseline
attack, the pruning defense reduced the backdoor attack success rate to 13% with
only 4% reduction in classification accuracy. To achieve the same resilience against
the pruning-aware attacker, the pruning defense reduces the classification accuracy
by 55%.
– The pruning defense is also ineffective on backdoored traffic sign recognition (see
Fig 6(f)). Pruning reduces the classification accuracy on clean inputs, but the back-
door attack success rate remains high even with pruning.
Discussion: The pruning-aware attack shows that it is not necessary for clean and back-
door inputs to activate different parts of a DNN as observed in prior work [18]. We find,
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instead, that both clean and backdoor activity can be mapped to the same subset of neu-
rons, at least for the attacks we experimented with. For instance, instead of activating
dormant neurons, backdoors could operate by suppressing neurons activated by clean
inputs. In addition, the commonly used ReLU activation function, used in all of the
DNNs we evaluated in this paper, enables backdoors to be encoded by how strongly a
neuron is activated as opposed to which neurons are activated since its output ranges
from [0,∞).
3.3 Fine-Pruning Defense
The pruning defense only requires the defender to evaluate (or execute) a trained DNN
on validation data by performing a single forward pass through the network per vali-
dation input. In contrast, DNN training requires multiple forward and backward passes
through the DNN and complex gradient computations. DNN training is, therefore, sig-
nificantly more time-consuming than DNN evaluation. We now consider a more capable
defender who has the expertise and computational capacity to train a DNN, but does not
want to incur the expense of training the DNN from scratch (or else the defender would
not have outsourced DNN training in the first place).
Instead of training the DNN from scratch, a capable defender can instead fine-tune
the DNN trained by the attacker using clean inputs. Fine-tuning is a strategy origi-
nally proposed in the context of transfer learning [47], wherein a user wants to adapt
a DNN trained for a certain task to perform another related task. Fine-tuning uses the
pre-trained DNN weights to initialize training (instead of random initialization) and a
smaller learning rate since the final weights are expected to be relatively close to the pre-
trained weights. Fine-tuning is significantly faster than training a network from scratch;
for instance, our fine-tuning experiments on AlexNet terminate within an hour while
training AlexNet from scratch can take more than six days [22]. Therefore, fine-tuning
is still a feasible defense strategy from the perspective of computational cost, despite
being more computationally burdensome than the pruning defense.
Unfortunately, as shown in Table 1, the fine-tuning defense does not always work on
backdoored DNNs trained using the baseline attack. The reason for this can be under-
stood as follows: the accuracy of the backdoored DNN on clean inputs does not depend
on the weights of backdoor neurons since these are dormant on clean inputs in any case.
Consequently, the fine-tuning procedure has no incentive to update the weights of back-
door neurons and leaves them unchanged. Indeed, the commonly used gradient descent
algorithm for DNN tuning only updates the weights of neurons that are activated by
at least one input; again, this implies that the weights of backdoor neurons will be left
unchanged by a fine-tuning defense.
Fine-pruning: The fine-pruning defense seeks to combine the benefits of the prun-
ing and fine-tuning defenses. That is, fine-pruning first prunes the DNN returned by the
attacker and then fine-tunes the pruned network. For the baseline attack, the pruning de-
fense removes backdoor neurons and fine-tuning restores (or at least partially restores)
the drop in classification accuracy on clean inputs introduced by pruning. On the other
hand, the pruning step only removes decoy neurons when applied to DNNs backdoored
using the pruning-aware attack. However, subsequent fine-tuning eliminates backdoors.
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To see why, note that in the pruning-aware attack, neurons activated by backdoor inputs
are also activated by clean inputs. Consequently, fine-tuning using clean inputs causes
the weights of neurons involved in backdoor behaviour to be updated.
Table 1. Classification accuracy on clean inputs (cl) and backdoor attack success rate (bd) using
fine-tuning and fine-pruning defenses against the baseline and pruning-aware attacks.
Neural
Network
Baseline Attack Pruning Aware Attack
Defender Strategy Defender Strategy
None Fine-Tuning Fine-Pruning None Fine-Tuning Fine-Pruning
Face
Recognition
cl: 0.978
bd: 1.000
cl: 0.978
bd: 0.000
cl: 0.978
bd: 0.000
cl: 0.974
bd: 0.998
cl: 0.978
bd: 0.000
cl: 0.977
bd: 0.000
Speech
Recognition
cl: 0.990
bd: 0.770
cl: 0.990
bd: 0.435
cl: 0.988
bd: 0.020
cl: 0.988
bd: 0.780
cl: 0.988
bd: 0.520
cl: 0.986
bd: 0.000
Traffic Sign
Detection
cl: 0.849
bd: 0.991
cl: 0.857
bd: 0.921
cl: 0.873
bd: 0.288
cl: 0.820
bd: 0.899
cl: 0.872
bd: 0.419
cl: 0.874
bd: 0.366
Empirical Evaluation of Fine-Pruning Defense: We evaluate the fine-pruning defense
on all three backdoor attacks under both the baseline attacker as well as the more so-
phisticated pruning-aware attacker described in Section 3.2. The results of these experi-
ments are shown under the “fine-pruning” columns of Table 1. We highlight three main
points about these results:
– In the worst case, fine-pruning reduces the accuracy of the network on clean data by
just 0.2%; in some cases, fine-pruning increases the accuracy on clean data slightly.
– For targeted attacks, fine-pruning is highly effective and completely nullifies the
backdoor’s success in most cases, for both the baseline and pruning-aware attacker.
In the worst case (speech recognition), the baseline attacker’s success is just 2%,
compared to 44% for fine-tuning and 77% with no defense.
– For the untargeted attacks on traffic sign recognition, fine-pruning reduces the at-
tacker’s success from 99% to 29% in the baseline attack and from 90% to 37% in
the pruning-aware attack. Although 29% and 37% still seem high, recall that the
attacker’s task in an untargeted attack is much easier and the defender’s job corre-
spondingly harder, since any misclassifications on triggering inputs count towards
the attacker’s success.
Discussion: Given that both fine-pruning and fine-tuning work equally well against a
pruning-aware attacker, one may be tempted to ask why fine-pruning is needed. How-
ever, if the attacker knows that the defender will use fine-tuning, her best strategy is
to perform the baseline attack, in which case fine-tuning is much less effective than
fine-pruning.
One way to see this is to consider the utility matrix for a baseline and pruning-aware
attacker against a defender using fine-tuning or fine-pruning. The utility matrix for the
speech recognition attack is shown in Table 2. We can define the defender’s utility as
simply the clean set accuracy minus the attacker’s success rate (the game is zero-sum so
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Table 2. Defender’s utility matrix for the speech recognition attack. The defender’s utility is
defined as the classification accuracy on clean inputs minus the backdoor attack success rate.
Utility
Attacker Strategy
Baseline Attack Pruning Aware Attack
Defender
Strategy
Fine-Tuning 0.555 0.468
Fine-Pruning 0.968 0.986
the attacker’s utility is symmetric). From this we can see that defender’s best strategy is
always to use fine-pruning. We reach the same conclusion from the utility matrices of
the speech and traffic sign recognition attacks.
Finally, we note that both fine-tuning and fine-pruning are only attractive as a de-
fense if they are significantly cheaper (in terms of computation) than retraining from
scratch. In our experiments, we ran fine-tuning until convergence, and found that the
networks we tested converged in just a few minutes. Although these experiments were
performed on a cluster with high-end GPUs available (NVIDIA P40, P100, K80, and
GTX 1080), even if a less powerful GPU is used (say, one that is 10X slower) we can see
that fine-pruning is still significantly more efficient than training from scratch, which
can take several days in the case of large models such as AlexNet [22].
4 Discussion
Looking at how each portion of the fine-pruning defense works, we note that their ef-
fects are complementary, which helps us understand why their combination is effective
even though each individually does not fully remove the backdoor. Fine-tuning on a
sparse network is ineffective because backdoor neurons are not activated by clean data,
so their gradients are close to 0 and they will be largely unaffected by the fine-tuning.
However, these are precisely the neurons that will be selected for pruning, since their
activations on clean data are low. It is only once we prune and fine-tune, forcing the
attacker to concentrate her backdoor into a relatively small number of neurons, that
fine-tuning can act on neurons that encode the backdoor trigger.
The fact that backdoors can be removed automatically is surprising from the per-
spective of prior research into backdoors in traditional software and hardware. Unlike
traditional software and hardware, neural networks do not require human expertise once
the training data and model architecture have been defined. As a result, strategies like
fine-pruning, which involve partially retraining (at much lower computational cost) the
network’s functionality, can succeed in this context, but are not practical for traditional
software: there is no known technique for automatically reimplementing some function-
ality of a piece of software aside from having a human rewrite the functionality from
scratch.
We cannot guarantee that our defense is the last word in DNN backdoor attacks
and defenses. We can think of the fine-tuning as a continuation of the normal training
procedure from some set of initialization parametersΘi. In an adversarial context,Θi is
determined by the attacker. Hence, if an attacker hopes to preserve their attack against
our fine-pruning, they must provide a Θi with a nearby local minimum (in terms of the
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loss surface with respect to the clean dataset) that still contains their backdoor. We do
not currently have a strong guarantee that such a Θi cannot be found; however, we note
that a stronger (though more computationally expensive) version of fine-pruning could
add some noise to the parameters before fine-tuning. In the limit, there must exist some
amount of noise that would cause the network to “forget” the backdoor, since adding
sufficiently large amounts of noise would be equivalent to retraining the network from
scratch with random initialization. We believe the question of how much noise is needed
to be an interesting area for future research.
4.1 Threats to Validity
The backdoor attacks studied in this paper all share a similar underlying model ar-
chitecture: convolutional neural networks with ReLU activations. These networks are
widely used in practice for many different tasks, but they are not the only architectures
available. For example, recurrent neural networks (RNNs) and long short term memory
networks (LSTMs) are commonly used in sequential processing tasks such as natural
language processing. To the best of our knowledge, backdoor attacks have not yet been
explored thoroughly in these architectures; as a result, we cannot be sure that our de-
fense is applicable to all deep networks.
5 Related Work
We will discuss two categories of related work: early work on poisoning attacks on
classic (non-DNN) machine learning, and more recent work on backdoors in neural
networks. We will not attempt to recap, here, the extensive literature on adversarial in-
puts and defenses so far. Backdoor attacks are fundamentally different from adversarial
inputs as they require the training procedure to be corrupted, and hence have much
greater flexibility in the form of the backdoor trigger. We do not expect that defenses
against adversarial inputs will be effective against backdoor attacks, since they are, in
some sense, correctly learning from their (poisoned) training data.
Barreno et al. [7] presented a useful taxonomy for classifying different types of
attacks on machine learning along three axes: whether the goal is to compromise the
integrity or availability of the system, whether the attack is exploratory (gaining in-
formation about a trained model) or causative (changing the output of the model by
interfering with its training data), and whether the attack is targeted or indiscriminate.
Many of the early attacks on machine learning were exploratory attacks on network
and host-based intrusion detection systems [43,41,15,14] or spam filters [44,29,30,23].
Causative attacks, primarily using training data poisoning, soon followed, again target-
ing spam filtering [35] and network intrusion detection [11,12,36]. Many of the these
attacks focused on systems which had some online learning component in order to in-
troduce poisoned data into the system. Suciu et al. [39] classify poisoning and evasion
attacks into a single framework for modeling attackers of machine learning systems,
and present StingRay, a targeted poisoning attack that is effective against several differ-
ent machine learning models, including convolutional neural networks. Some defenses
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against data poisoning attacks have also been proposed: for example, Liu et al. [26] dis-
cuss a technique for performing robust linear regression in the presence of noisy data
and adversarially poisoned training samples by recovering a low-rank subspace of the
feature matrix.
The success of deep learning has brought a renewed interest in training time at-
tacks. Because training is more expensive, outsourcing is common and so threat models
in which the attacker can control the parameters of the training procedure are more
practical. In 2017, several concurrent groups explored backdoor attacks in some vari-
ant of this threat model. In addition to the three attacks described in detail in Sec-
tion 2.3 [18,10,27], Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. [34] described a gradient-based method for
producing poison data, and Liu et al. [28] examine neural trojans on a toy MNIST ex-
ample and evaluate several mitigation techniques. In the context of the taxonomy given
by Barreno et al. [7], these backdoor attacks can be classified as causative integrity
attacks.
Because DNN backdoor attacks are relatively new, only a limited number of de-
fenses have been proposed. Chen et al. [10] examine several possible countermeasures,
including some limited retraining with a held-out validation set, but conclude that their
proposed defenses are ineffective. Similarly, in their NDSS 2017 paper, Liu et al. [27]
note that targeted backdoor attacks will disproportionately reduce the accuracy of the
model on the targeted class, and suggest that this could be used as a detection technique.
Finally, Liu et al.’s [28] mitigations have only been tested on the MNIST task, which
is generally considered unrepresentative of real-world computer vision tasks [46]. Our
work is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to present a fully effective defense against
DNN backdoor attacks on real-world models.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored defenses against recently-proposed backdoor attacks on deep
neural networks. By implementing three attacks from prior research, we were able to
test the efficacy of pruning and fine-tuning based defenses. We found that neither pro-
vides strong protection against backdoor attacks, particularly in the presence of an ad-
versary who is aware of the defense being used. Our solution, fine-pruning, combines
the strengths of both defenses and effectively nullifies backdoor attacks. Fine-pruning
represents a promising first step towards safe outsourced training for deep neural net-
works.
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